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This paper explores the dynamics of voting over mandatory education when parents
allocate children’s time between school and labor. When poverty keeps a suﬃciently
high number of children at work rather than in school, the availability of forms of child
labor that provide skill-enhancing learning-by-doing can be essential for compulsory
education laws to emerge in a steady state. In poor countries where poor children are
involved in the forms of child labor that provide too little or no learning-by-doing,
such laws may fail to win political support thereby causing the economy to fall into a
poverty trap. This paper therefore support the view that certain forms of child labor,
particularly the most harmful ones should be banned, to allow poor family children
to enter only those forms of child labor that provide learning-by-doing.
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11 Introduction
Until a little more than 150 years ago, child labor was a common practice in most
countries, including the United States and Great Britain. Today, many countries
have laws banning or restricting child labor. The ILO convention C138 against child
labor has been ratiﬁed by 89 countries, indicating opposition to child labor generally
among these countries. Yet it is not clear from the current state of economic theory
what forces drive the emergence of opposition to child labor.
A simple explanation is based upon the general perception that child labor hin-
ders children’s education which many believe is in the best interest of children’s own
lives, and of the society as a whole, in terms of the quality of its future labor force.
While this is understood, yet among many developing countries, opposition to child
labor is yet to become the norm. Morocco, for example, made education compulsory
in 1963. But 40 years on, government authorities admit that 2.5 million children are
out of school, implying a failure to enforce this law. To explain their tolerance for
this phenomenon these authorities argue that child labor is the lesser of two evils
in a country where the current education system produces 100,000 jobless graduates
ay e a r . 1 Another example is Equador, the main exporter of banana in the world.
Banana-industry oﬃcials admit that about 3% of the industry’s farm workforce (or
7,500 people) is under the legal working age of 14 mainly because lack of better
1See The Economist, Oct 5th 2000.
1alternative draws children into economic activities, as a means to survive.2 These
observations suggest that education/child labor laws are not really initiators of eco-
nomic changes, but that such changes are necessary for opposition to child labor to
gain a momentum.
In support of this presumption, there is also the observation that even for coun-
tries which have now adopted child labor/education laws with great success (Great
Britain and the United States, are a few examples), support for these laws took years
perhaps decades before it ﬁnally outweighed its opposition. Moehling (1999) gives an
extensive account of the history of child labor laws in the United States from the ﬁrst
half of the nineteenth century to the early twentieth century. Legislative progress,
she argues, only came in the last few decades of the nineteenth century, after social
pressure for child labor legislation had developed into a well-organized social move-
ment, including a number of labor unions. Likewise, Grootaert and Kanbur (1995)
show that only after the incidence of child labor had already begun to decline, in
1833, a time when 36.6 % of boys aged 10-14 were working, did Britain pass leg-
islation restricting child labor. This, as well as the observation by Goldin (1979)
that higher wages for fathers in Philadelphia in the late nineteenth century reduced
the probability of child labor, suggest that economic changes which took place over
time must have brought about the emergence of education/child labor laws. If this is
true, what then is the nature of economic forces likely to transform anti-child labor
2See The Economist, april 2002.
2movements over time into a winning political coalition to end child labor? This is the
central analytical question driving this paper. Addressing this question is extremely
important, given the general perception that child labor should be tolerated in today’s
poor countries, even though this may deprive children with the opportunity to escape
intergenerational transmission of poverty through skill-enhancing formal education,
for example.
In this paper, we develop a theory of the emergence of education/child labor
laws that uncovers suﬃcient conditions for opposition to such laws to decline over
time. The emphasis on the role played by time in bringing about support for such
laws is one of our important contributions, and is consistent with empirical evidence.
We use an heterogeneous-agents-overlapping-generations model that draws from Basu
and Van’s (1998) labor-market-based explanation for the incentive to restrict children
participation in the labor market. In our model, altruistic parents make child labor-
education decisions individually, while they collectively decide, by way of majority
voting, on whether or not to restrict children’s participation in the labor market.
This creates a potential conﬂict between individual and collective interests. On one
hand, a poor parent may need the income contribution of his child in order to help
ﬁght poverty. On the other hand, adult workers say, through their labor union, may
collectively want to eliminate competitors using cheap child labor, as the elimination
of such competition may cause the adult wage to rise, thus reducing the need for
children’s economic contribution. We formalize this potential conﬂict between the
3individual interest and the collective interest as the driving force of the opposition to
child labor/education laws. In particular, opponents are poorer parent-workers who
stand to face a welfare loss in the event that they are forced by law to give up income
from child labor sources. For this group of parents, even though they may each know
that education/child labor laws may raise the value of their own labor, they may still
decide to oppose these laws, if the wage gain from restricting child labor is lower than
the income from child labor sources.
We assume that a ban on child labor is implemented by way of compulsory educa-
tion, and study the emergence of compulsory education laws in an environment where
formal education and on-the-job learning-by-doing are two potential sources of social
mobility-enhancing skill acquisition. We a r g u et h a ta ne c o n o m yw h e r el e a r n i n g - b y -
doing and formal education are two alternative engine of social-mobility-enhancing
skill acquisition, presents all the characteristics of a system wherein compulsory ed-
ucation laws can emerge endogenously over time.
2 Some Stylized Facts
In this section, we provide empirical evidence for three key assumptions of this pa-
per. Two of these assumptions are captured by the aggregate production function
postulated in this paper, while the other is a feature of the state transition matrix
characterizing intergenerational social mobility.
A. Sources of Social Pressure against Child Labor
4It is well-understood that pressure for the elimination of child labor can either
have domestic sources or foreign sources. Domestically, in many countries includ-
ing the nineteenth century US, social movements of various origins have emerged in
defense of children’s rights (Moehling 1999). In the international arena, several inter-
national organizations (the International Labor Organization and the World Trade
Organization are examples) have joined hands to combat child labor, often with the
support of rich countries. In our paper, we focus on domestic sources by emphasizing
that worker-parents vote on a legislative proposal to restrict children’s participation
in the labor force. We hypothesize that worker-parents channel their pressure through
their labor unions. These parents workers, through their labor unions for example,
may want to eliminate competitors using cheap child labor, because eliminating this
competition may cause their wage to rise. There exists some empirical evidence sup-
porting this motive for social pressure against child labor. Moehling (1999) reveals
that social pressure for child labor legislation in nineteenth century US only became a
well-organized social movement with the participation of organized labor unions such
as the American Federation of Labor, which sought to eliminate competition from
cheaper sources of labor. The leading argument was that ﬁrms were using child labor
as a means to cut down on costs, by replacing more costly adult workers with chil-
dren. In support to this idea, Levison et al. (1998) reveal that in India, for example,
children in general were paid about half of the adult wage, even when they had the
same productivity.
5B. Substitutability between Adult Labor and Child Labor
To capture the fact that child labor crowds out adult employment, child labor and
adult labor are modeled as being perfectly substitutable and the aggregate production
function exhibit decreasing returns to scale to labor measured in eﬃciency units.
Note that ours is not the ﬁrst study to assume the substitutability between adult
and child labor. Basu and Van (1998) make a similar assumption. Opponent of this
view have put forward a number of arguments. The most remarkable one is perhaps
the so-called “nimble-ﬁnger” argument. According to this argument, children and
adults diﬀer in work characteristics which lead to market segmentation. However,
Levison et al. (1998) reject this “nimble ﬁnger” argument based upon a case study
of the handnotted carpet industry in the Indian state of Uttar Pradesh. They argue
that child labor was not really necessary in the Indian carpet industry, and that
its existence only succeeded in creating high levels of adult unemployment and/or
under-employment. They also conclude, based upon that case study, that developing
countries’s tolerance of child labor could only come at the expense of adult jobs.
C. Education and Learning-by-doing as Sources of Skill Acquisition
In our paper, both education and child labor are potential sources of skill-acquisition.
There are a signiﬁcant number of studies that formalize education as a mechanism
of skill accumulation. Lucas (1988), and Kremer and Chen (2000) are only a few
examples. According to the World Bank, countries with the highest levels of aver-
age educational attainment are also the richest (see for example World Development
6Report 2002), thus providing evidence of the key role played by education as a skill
acquisition mechanism.
Evidence that child labor entails learning-by-doing is somewhat mixed in the
existing literature. Some empirical studies (for example, Galbi 1997) lend support to
this assumption. Galbi (1997) reveals that in the beginning of the industrial revolution
in Britain, children were preferred to adults for manufacturing employment. However,
as early cohorts of children laborers gained more experience in the use of modern
technology and became skilled adults, this led to a decline, over time, in the use of
child labor.
Other studies, in contrast, reject the learning-by-doing hypothesis based upon the
view that working children in developing countries are usually involved in hazardous
labor activities such as drug-dealing, child prostitution and pornography which pro-
vide virtually no basis for learning valuable productive skills (see for example Lim
1998). What this literature really suggests is that not all forms of child labor entail
learning-by-doing. While one cannot imagine child prostitution or pornography as an
activity that teaches valuable skills to children, nor can one hope to see such skills ac-
quired by a child involved in street-begging or drug-dealings, it is generally accepted
that, in the case of manufactory employment, child labor, if done under appropriate
conditions, can help a child acquire valuable experience in the operation of modern in-
dustrial technology. The case of the industrial revolution in England (Galbi 1997) and
that of the nineteenth century United States (Goldin and Sokoloﬀ 1982) oﬀer support
7for this theory.3 We argue, in this paper, that where a suﬃciently high proportion
of working children have access to forms of child labor that provide opportunities for
learning-by-doing, the economy will converge to a steady state where the emergence
of compulsory education laws can be supported as a steady-state, political-economic,
equilibrium.
3 Literature Review
Recent theories of child labor in the literature include Glomm (1997), Dessy (2000),
and Ranjan (2001) but these models do not imply a theory of the emergence of child-
labor laws. Other approaches to analyzing child labor however could also yield a
theory of child-labor laws. For instance Basu and Van (1998), rely on the hypothesis of
multiple equilibria in the market for unskilled labor to explain why in some countries
banning child-labor could be welfare-enhancing. To the extent that child labor and
adult labor are substitutes, a poverty-induced massive participation of children in
the labor force may contribute to a decline in adult wages, thus maintaining in place
the forces that perpetuate poverty and child labor. It is not clear however what
the empirical implications for child labor laws would be of such an approach; poor
countries would seem to beneﬁt equally from banning child-labor, so an explanation
of the tolerance of child labor in these countries would be required. This is also a
3Goldin and Sokoloﬀ (1982) reveal that in the United States, child labor was an important com-
ponent of the manufacturing workforce in the ﬁrst half of the nineteenth century. They estimated
that children accounted for over 20% of manufacturing employment in the Northeast in 1820.
8diﬃculty for Baland and Robinson (2000), who argue that child labor laws can reduce
ineﬃciency in inter-generational allocations, but not why some countries fail to ban
child labor.
Dessy and Pallage (2001) build a model in which coordination failures lead to
ineﬃcient child labor. Their model explains tolerance of child labor for countries that
are too poor to aﬀord the costs associated with the creation of a modern industrial
sector (for example, the costs of building development infrastructures). However, the
model which is static in nature, begs the question of how decades of development aid
did not succeed in breaking down opposition to child labor laws in poor countries.
Dessy and Vencatachellum (2002) proposes a standard externality model that
diﬀerentiate between countries that adopt child labor laws and those that do not.
In their model, either poverty or inequality are to blame for lack of support for
compulsory education laws. However, since their model is static, it does not explain
the process that can lead to a decline in the incidence of poverty, and eventually to
the emergence of education/child labor laws in initially poor countries. Nor does it
discuss the feasibility of income redistribution. In our model, education and learning-
by-doing combine as two potential engines of poverty and inequality-reducing social
mobility, and may lead to the emergence of compulsory education laws over time in
a country that initially face a stiﬀ opposition to the adoption of such laws.
Doepke and Zilibotti’s (2002) paper appears to be the most closely related to ours.
Both our theories are anchored by a dynamic, intertemporal model of the political
9economy of child labor laws. While their model emphasizes endogenous fertility, ours
is one of exogenous fertility and focuses excl u s i v e l yo nt h en a t u r eo fe c o n o m i cf a c t o r s
that lead to a rise over time of political support for compulsory education laws.
Unlike Doepke and Zilibotti, we explicitly derive and discuss suﬃcient conditions
for compulsory education laws to emerge in a steady state. Since in our model the
unskilled parents always oppose compulsory education laws, and do not send their
children to school, it is important that a suﬃciently high proportion of children born of
these parents have access to forms of child labor that provide opportunities for social-
mobility-enhancing learning-by-doing, otherwise this group of parents will continue
to form the political majority that opposes compulsory education laws. Because of its
emphasis on forces driving the emergence of education/child labor laws, our theory
also lends support to the recent ILO convention 188 banning the worst forms of child
labor. To the extent that the worst forms of child labor do not entail learning-by-
doing, our theory suggests that banning these forms of child labor in poor countries
may allow poor family children to enroll only in the type of child labor that provide
opportunity for learning-by-doing.
Another distinguishing element between the two models is that unlike in Doepke
and Zilibotti (2002), in our model, substitutability between child labor and adult
labor is not restricted to the unskilled adults only, at least at the aggregate level. At
the ﬁrm level, it is some evidence that substitutability is usually between child labor
and unskilled adult labor (Levison et al., 1998). But there is no hard evidence that
10this substitutability is restricted to the unskilled adult labor in the industry level or
aggregate level. Suppose there are two types of ﬁrms producing the same output. The
ﬁrst type operates in the formal sector and combines skilled labor and adult unskilled
labor for production, while the second type operates in the informal sector and uses
child labor only. Competition between these two types of ﬁrms in the output market
can drive the output price down, thus keeping all wages low, including that of skilled
labor. It is then clear that banning the second type of ﬁrms will have a positive eﬀect
on wages for both skilled and unskilled workers. This diﬀerence between two models,
however, proved to be purely semantic.
4 The Model
Assume that there is a continuum of agents who live for three periods. In the ﬁrst
period they are children, in the next period there are working parents, with one
c h i l de a c h ,a n di nt h eﬁnal period they are retired. Parents supply one unit of
labor inelastically in the second period, while children’s time in the second period
is allocated between education and labor. Parents are distinguished by their skill
levels, h, which depend on the level of skill they acquire the ﬁrst period of their lives.
There are three possible levels of skills corresponding to three social classes: a low or
unskilled class (class u), a middle or intermediate skill class (class m), and an upper
or high-skill class (class s). We denote the skill levels as hu,h m,a n dhs, respectively,
with hu <h m <h s. In the beginning of the ﬁrst period of adult-hood (period 2),
11adults individuals vote over the child-labor law that will obtain in the period, then
they each have a child, and decide on household eﬀective labor supply to ﬁrms. The
law takes the form of a minimum time children must spend in school.
A. Final Output Production
There is a unique ﬁnal good which is entirely allocated to household consumption.
Aggregate output is given by
Y = ALξ,A > 0, 0 < ξ < 1, (1)
where A is a scale factor measuring the level of technology used, and ξ is a labor-
productivity parameter. The above technology exhibits diminishing marginal pro-
ductivity of labor at the aggregate level. This formulation is designed to capture
the empirical evidence that ﬁrms using cheap child labor create a pressure for adult-
underemployment at the aggregate level. The total quantity of labor, L, demanded
by the aggregate of the ﬁrms in this economy equals the sum across all households of




µi [hi +( 1− ei)h0], (2)
where 1−ei denotes child’s time allocated to work, µi denotes the number of parent-
workers with skill levels in the class i (i = m,s,u), and h0 denotes each child’s
endowment of human capital. The production environment as described by (1) and
(2) exhibits four of the standard features of existing exogenous fertility models of
parental investment (e.g. Basu and Van 1998). First, adult eﬀective labor supply is
12inelastic: each adult individual i allocates his entire time endowment to the delivery
of human capital to ﬁrms so that his eﬀective labor supply is hi. Second, the eﬀec-
tive labor supply of a child is endogenous: it is equal to the child’s human capital
endowment (h0) times the time (1 − ei) the child spends delivering it to ﬁrms. This
latter time allocation is the object of parental decision (Glomm 1997, Basu and Van
1998, Dessy 2000). Third, adult labor and child labor are substitutable (Basu and
Van 1998). Fourth, the aggregate production function exhibits diminishing marginal
productivity of labor. Combined with perfect competition, the third and fourth fea-
tures together imply that reducing children participation in the labor force will cause
a rise in adults’ labor income which is equal to ωhi. Under perfect competition, the





µi [hi +( 1− ei)h0]
#ξ−1
. (3)
Because of this wage eﬀect of law restricting children participation in the labor force,
adult workers, through their labor unions for example, have the incentive to col-
lectively push for the adoption of such law in order to drive out of the market all
competitors using child labor. Whether this incentive will materialize depends upon,
as we show below, on whether for a majority of parents, the gain from a wage increase
outweighs the lost due to forgone income from child labor sources.
B. Preferences and Budget Constraint
Parents are expected lifetime utility maximizers with cardinal utility over con-
13sumption, c, and the skill realization of their child, hc ∈ {hu,h m,h s}:
u(c)+βE [ν (hc)], 0 < β < 1( 4 )
where β denotes the intergenerational time-discounting factor. The functions u and
ν are strictly increasing, strictly concave and satisfy the Inada conditions.
Without loss of generality, we normalize direct education costs to zero, so that
the budget constraint faced by a parent with skill level hi is given by
ci ≤ y(hi,e i,ω), (5)
where y(hi,e i,ω) denotes household income as speciﬁed in (6). The problem faced
by each parent of type i is to maximize (4) subject to (5).
Household income depends on the parental skill level hj ∈ {hu,h m,h s}, and the
labor supply (1 − e) of the child, where e is time spent in education. Per unit time,
the quantity of labor supplied equals h0 for child workers, and equals the skill level
hi f o rp a r e n t s .W ea s s u m et h a th0 is constant across children. Thus for a given wage
ω, the household income for a parent with skill hi and whose child has education e is
given by:
y(hi,e i,ω)=[ hi + h0 (1 − ei)]ω. (6)
C. Skill Acquisition and Social Mobility
At the beginning of the third period of life, the child becomes a parent and learns
his realization of skill. The transition probabilities of a child whose parent has skill
14level hi are given by πi,j (e) ≡ Pr(hj | hi,e), where πi,j (e) denotes the probability
of a child transiting to a state j, given that his parent is in state i, and a fraction
e of his time-endowment has been allocated to schooling. An agent is said to have
transited to state j (j = m,s,u) if his skill realization is hj ∈ {hu,h m,h s}.
Assume the transition probabilities are all linear in the education decisions, this
probability distribution gives rise to the following 3 × 3 state transition matrix:
Π =

      

πuu (eu) πmu (em) πsu (es)
πum (eu) πmm (em) πsm (es)
πus (eu) πms (em) πss (es)





πuu (eu)=1 − (1 − eu)ru − pueu (8)
πum (eu)=[ ( 1 − eu)ru + pueu]qu (9)
πus (eu)=[ ( 1 − eu)ru + pueu](1− qu)( 1 0 )
πmu (em)=[ 1 − (1 − em)rm − pmem](1− qm)( 1 1 )
πmm (em)=[ 1 − (1 − em)rm − pmem]qm (12)
πms (em)=( 1 − em)rm + pmem (13)
πsu (es)=[ 1 − (1 − es)rs − pses](1− qs)( 1 4 )
πsm (es)=[ 1 − (1 − es)rs − pses]qs (15)
πss (es)=( 1 − es)rs + pses (16)
and ri, pi,q i are positive parameters each of which takes values in the closed interval




Since school and child labor are the only competing claims on child’s time, (1 − ei)
denotes child’s time allocated to labor. The state transition probabilities in (8)-(16)
therefore capture the nature of forces that determine intergenerational social mobility
in this environment. In particular, upward social mobility has two competing sources:
one is on-the-job learning-by-doing (the term ri) and the other is formal schooling
(the term pi). A straightforward inspection of the structure of transition probabilities
in (8)-(16) reveal an important feature of our model: whether or not schooling is a
more viable option for children’s time use depends at least in part, upon the marginal
productivity diﬀerential (pi − ri) between formal schooling and child labor as skill-
acquisition mechanisms. In particular, if pi − ri < 0, work will be preferred to
schooling no matter the eﬀect on the adult wage. Therefore, a necessary condition
for schooling to be a viable option for children’s time use is that pi − ri > 0.
The parameter pi can be interpreted as a measure of the marginal productivity
of formal schooling as a mechanism for social-mobility-enhancing skill-acquisition for
children whose parents have skill level is the class i (i = m,s,u). We impose the
following condition:
A.1 ps >p m >p u.
This assumption can be justiﬁed as follows. First, available evidence suggests
16that returns to education for poor children are relatively low due in large part to poor
school quality and availability (Anker 2000). In contrast, children from richer families
usually have access to better schools and are provided with a better learning environ-
ment at home. This is particularly true in countries where there are community or
regional diﬀerences in levels of school-ﬁnancing. Children living in poor communities
or regions may face poor school quality, for example in terms of pupil/teacher ratio,
teachers’ quality, and/or school curricula.4 Finally, anecdotal evidence also suggests
that assumption A.1 may simply be justiﬁed by the fact that more educated parents
may be better at cultivating good learning habits in their children.
By analogy to the parameter pi, the parameter ri can be interpreted as a measure
of the marginal productivity of learning-by-doing as a mechanism of upward social
mobility. This explains why the term ri is multiplied by the time a child spends
working: (1 −ei). When ri = 0, the type of work performed by the child simply does
not entail learning-by-doing. In contrast, as long as ri > 0, working (i.e., 1 − ei > 0)
entails the acquisition of social mobility-enhancing skills. For the remainder of this
paper, we assume the following.
A.2 pi − ri > 0, all i = m,s,u.
Assumption A.2 simply states that education is more eﬀective than on-the-job
learning as a mechanism of upward social mobility.
4Doepke (2001) reveals that although Brazil instituted compulsory education as early as 1930, in
rural areas, there were either no schools available or the quality was simply too low.
17A ﬁnal feature captured by the above transition matrix is that, due to the ranking
between classes, social mobility has class-speciﬁc features. For children whose parents
are in the unskilled group, social mobility, when it occurs, is solely an upward move-
ment toward higher classes (intermediate-skill group or high-skill group). For these
children, whether leapfrogging to the high-skill group (class s) will occur depends
upon the level of the parameter qu. This parameter measures the extent to which
social mobility for these children is biased toward the intermediate-skill group. In
particular, the higher qu the smaller the likelihood that children whose parents are in
the low-skill group will leapfrog to the high-skill group (see 8)-(10) above.
For children whose parents are in the intermediate-skill group, social mobility
has two possible directions: it can be downward towards class u with probability
[1 − (1 − em)rm − empm](1− qm), or upward toward the high-skill group, with prob-
ability (1 − em)rm + pmem. Whether mobility is biased upward or downward is
determined by the level of qm.
For children whose parents are in the high-skill group, social mobility is ex-
clusively a downward movement: with probability [1 − (1 − es)rs − pes]qs,t h e s e
children can drop to the intermediate-skill group (class m), while with probability
[1 − (1 − es)rs − pses](1− qs) the drop will be deeper and into the low-skill cate-
gory. Whether the drop will be shorter (middle class) or deeper (low class) again
depends upon the parameter qs. The higher qs the smaller the likelihood of a deep
drop to the low class. Since theory puts no restriction on a parameter such as qi,f o r
18the remainder of this study, and without loss of generality, we restrict attention to
an environment characterized by the following assumption:
A.3 Social mobility is only possible between two adjacent skill groups: qu = qs =1 .
Assumption A.3 is made for purely technical reasons, in order to keep the analysis
tractable enough. With this assumption, the state-transition matrix becomes:
Π =

      

1 − (1 − eu)ru − pueu [1 − (1 − em)rm − pmem](1− qm)0
(1 − eu)ru + pueu [1 − (1 − em)rm − pmem]qm 1 − (1 − es)rs − pses
0( 1 − em)rm + pmem (1 − es)rs + pses

      

(17)
Assumption A.3 implies that no poor family child can leap-frog into the high class,
nor can a high-class child drops down to the lower-class.
C. Education Decisions
Laws restricting child labor take the form of minimum-education requirements:
e ≥ 0. We assume that such laws cannot be made conditional upon the education
of the parents. The state of the economy is a vector: µ = {µu,µ m,µ s} ∈ M,t h a t
gives the distribution of voting-age parents over skill levels. We assume that parents
choose their minimum education law proposal by anticipating the eﬀect this choice
will have on their allocation of child’s time between school and work. This allows us
to solve the parents problem using backward induction.





u(w[hi + h0 (1 − ei)]) + β
X
j




s.t. ei ≥ e.
19For a logarithmic speciﬁcation of utility functions u and ν,t h eﬁrst-order condition
f o ra ni n t e r i o rs o l u t i o ni s
h0
hi +( 1− ei)h0
= βWi,i = m,s,u (19)
where
Wu =( pu − ru)[lnhm − lnhu]. (20)
Wm =( pm − rm)[lnhs − qm lnhm − (1 − qm)lnhu]( 2 1 )
Ws =( ps − rs)[lnhs − lnhm]. (22)
Condition (19) states that the optimal education policy for a parent with skill level
in class i is the level of child’s time allocated to schooling that equates the (marginal)
utility loss from reducing household consumption to educate the child (the term in
the left-hand side) to the (marginal) utility gain from raising a child who transits to a
higher-skill class when adult (the term in the right-hand side). Clearly, the lower the
productivity diﬀerential (pi − ri) the lower the utility gain from educating the child.
For children whose parents are in the unskilled group, for example, the utility gain
from educating the child is higher the higher the income gap between the intermediate-
skill group and the unskilled group, as determined by the gap lnhm − lnhu. 5
5Note however that this utility gain may still be too small to tip the balance in favor of schooling
if pu is too small.
205 Equilibrium Dynamics
We distinguish between a market equilibrium and a political equilibrium. In a mar-
ket equilibrium, parents are individual decision makers who treat the wage, ω, as
given. This guarantees that equilibrium education decisions are independent of the
wage rate, at least for logarithmic preferences. We deﬁne a political equilibrium to
be a situation where the minimum education law voted for reﬂects the preferences
of the majority in a market equilibrium. In that context each parent knows that
his minimum-education requirement proposal, if passed, will restrict other parents’
child’s time allocation decision and hence the total supply of eﬀective labor. In other
words, each parent has perfect foresight over the eﬀects of the collective decision on
child labor regulation. Parents make their minimum-education requirement proposal
with this eﬀect in mind, and will support the imposition of a mandatory minimum ed-
ucation level if and only if, from an individual perspective, the gain from withdrawing
all children from the labor force exceeds its cost.
A. Market Equilibrium
A market equilibrium for the economy in state µ consists of decision rules for
education g (hi;e),at o t a ll a b o rd e m a n dL, a wage function ω, and a law of motion
T for µ, such that:
• g (hi;e) solves (19), given ω.
21• The goods and labor markets clear:
— ω = ξALξ−1, L =
P
i µi [hi +( 1− ei)h0].
• The skill distribution next period is given by: µ0 = Tµ =
Q
(e)µ,w h e r eµ0
denotes next period state that gives the distribution of voting-age parents over
skill levels.
Existence of a market equilibrium is trivial under the assumptions made; we know
that for any wage rate the decision rule is single-valued and continuous in the wage
(with log utility for consumption, it is independent of the current wage). Labor
supply is bounded above and below, and is increasing in ω. Since the wage function
is decreasing in L, there must exist a unique ω > 0 such that the labor market clears.
A steady-state market equilibrium is one in which the skill distribution µ is constant
over time: µ∗ =
Q
(e)µ∗.









µi (hi +[ 1− g(hi;e)]h0)
#1−ξ
. (24)
Using (23), and again assuming logarithmic preferences, we can write the market
22equilibrium value of being a parent with skill-status hi as




π [hj | hi,g(hi;e)]ln(hj)( 2 5 )
Because of the negative externality the economy-wide incidence of child labor has on
the labor wage, and hence on the equilibrium value for being a parent (see 25), it
becomes important to ask which parent will beneﬁt from constraining other parents
decision on their children’s time use through voting on the level of e. We address this
question further below.
B. Political Equilibrium
Consider voting over the education laws which require e ≥ e. Voting is restricted
to parents. Parents are called upon, in the beginning of their adulthood, and prior
to having children, to submit their proposal for a mandatory minimum-education
requirement, e, for all children. Each parent knows that his proposal, if adopted,
will constrain his own future education decisions, as well as that of other parents.
Consequently, each parent votes for the law that maximizes his future value for being
ap a r e n t .
To simplify the analysis of the dynamics of the economy, we assume throughout
the remainder of this study that voters must choose between two law proposals: either
e =0o re = 1. That is, the choice is whether or not to make education compulsory.
We denote the law by e(e) ∈ {0,1},a n db yΓ[e(e)] we denote the set of skill
levels such that parents with skill levels in that set are the decisive voters, in the
23sense that the law adopted reﬂects their preferred choice. Using the deﬁnition of
state transition probabilities, we can rewrite the equilibrium value of being a parent
with skill level hi when the adopted law is e(e)a sf o l l o w s :
V [hi;e(e)] = ln[hi +( 1− g [hi;e(e)])h0] − lnφ[e(e)] + βig [hi;e(e)] + Ri (26)
where βi = βWi, g [hi;e(e)] denotes the equilibrium education decision taken by a
parent with skill level hi when the adopted law is e(e), and
Rm =( 1 − rm)(1− qm)lnhu +( 1− rm)qm lnhm + rm lnhs +l nξA
Rs =( 1 − rs)lnhm + rs lnhs +l nξA
Ru =( 1 − ru)lnhu + ru lnhm +l nξA
Therefore, for all parents with a skill level hi ∈ Γ[e(e) ] ,i tm u s tb et h a t
V [hi;e(e)] ≥ V (hi;0), all e(e) ∈ {0,1};
while for those whose skill level is hi / ∈ Γ[e(e)],
V [hi;e(e)] <V(hi;0), all e(e) ∈ {0,1}.
A political equilibrium is an education law, e(e), and a distribution of voters ˆ µ such
that
P
i ˆ µ(hi) > 1/2 for all hi ∈ Γ[e(e)] and
P
i=m,s,u ˆ µ(hi) = 1. The function ˆ µ
associates to each skill level hi, the total number of adult individuals with that skill
level.
To keep the analysis simple and focus on the nature of forces that govern the emer-
gence of child labor/education laws, we characterize the system’s dynamics when law
24restricting child labor can emerge only in the steady state. We begin our discussion
with the characterization of equilibrium policies.
C. Equilibrium Allocation of Children’s Time Use
Let the education of each class of parents be denoted by e =[g (hm;e),g(hs;e),g(hu;e)].We
are now ready to state and prove the following proposition:
Proposition 1 Suppose that




       
       
e hi <h(e)
hi





1 hi > ¯ h
. (28)















Proof. The results follow from solving the ﬁrst order condition in (19) making use
of condition (27).
Note that by construction, since e ∈ [0,1], h(e) ≤ ¯ h, with equality only if e =1 .
Condition (27) implies that the marginal utility gain from educating a child is the
same across skill-groups. Since pu <p m <p s, one can choose ri, hi,p i,a n dqmsuch
25that this condition easily obtain. Before we proceed with the characterization of the
political equilibrium, we impose the following additional assumption:





,a n d( i i i )hs > ¯ h.
Note that one can always choose the parameters ri,p i and h0 such that assump-
tion A.4 easily obtains.
Proposition 2 Let conditions (27) hold. Then, under assumption A.4,
g[hu;e(e)] = e(e), for all e(e)( 3 1 )
g [hm;e(e)] =

   
   
g (hm;0)∈ (0,1) if e(e)=0
1 if e(e)=1
(32)
g [hs;e(e)] = 1, for all e(e). (33)
Proof. The result follows from proposition 1 combined with assumption A.4.
Proposition 2 describes the distribution of educational attainments among chil-
dren from diﬀerent family backgrounds. When education is not compulsory (i.e.,
e(e) = 0), children whose parents are in the low-skill group always receive no educa-
tion g [hu;0] = 0. Only when education is made compulsory by law do these children
attend school (see expression 31). In contrast, children whose parents are in the
intermediate skill-group combine schooling with child labor as their childhood activ-
ities when there are no compulsory education laws (see expression 32). As expected,
there is never child labor among children from high-skill parents, whatever the law
26on education (see expression 33). Given this distribution of educational attainments,
the key analytical question is which skill-group beneﬁt from supporting compulsory
education laws.
D. Agents’ Preferred Child Labor Laws
We now discuss each group of agents’ most preferred education/child labor law.
First, deﬁne ∆(hi) ≡ V (hi;1)−V (hi;0), where ∆(hi) denotes the net welfare beneﬁt
a parent with skill level hi derives from supporting a ban on child labor (we assume
that such a ban is implemented by compulsory education). If we normalize hu, h0,
and ¯ h such that
¯ h = hu + h0, (34)
then (28), (30), (26) and (24) can be combined to establish that
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µshs +( µu + µm)¯ h
¤
φ(1) = [µshs + µuhu + µmhm].
27Note that given µi one can easily verify that φ(0) > φ(1) since hu <h m < ¯ h,
by assumption A.4. This in turn implies that ∆(hs) > 0. In other words, parents
in the high-skill group always beneﬁt from supporting a ban on child labor. This a
consequence of our assumption that ﬁrms using cheap child labor represent an unfair
competition to ﬁrms using more costly adult labor. This provides an incentive for
labor unions representing adult workers to activate in favor of laws banning child
labor. However, labor unions representing adult workers will not act unless they have
the support of the majority of workers. We will characterize the determinants of
majority support further below.
Proposition 3 Let condition (34) hold and suppose
h0 ≥ ¯ β
¯ h − hm
ln¯ h − lnhm
(38)
and
¯ h − hm
hm − hu
>
ln¯ h − lnhm
lnhm − lnhu
. (39)
Then, ∆(hs) ≥ ∆(hm) > ∆(hu).
Proof. There are two claims:(i) ∆(hs) ≥ ∆(hm)i st r u e ;a n d( i i )∆(hm) > ∆(hu)
is also true. We begin with claim (i).
Claim (i): ∆(hs) ≥ ∆(hm). To prove this claim, it suﬃces to establish that
Ã
¯ h − hm
h0
!






Clearly, the result follows from condition (38) hold.
28Claim (ii): ∆(hm) > ∆(hu). To prove this claim, it suﬃces to show that
Ã
¯ h − hm
h0
!










At the expense of straightforward algebraic manipulations, it can be easily established
that the above inequality reduces to




Conditions (38) and (39) together ensures that this inequality always holds. hence
the result.
Condition (38) states that children’s innate skills are not negligible. Condition
(39) is a simple technicality and can easily obtain with a suitable normalization of hi
and h0 for i = m,s. Proposition 3 states that welfare gains from the imposition of
child labor/education law are non-decreasing in the skill level of the parent. While
it is clear that high-skill parents always beneﬁt from supporting laws banning child
labor, the preferred choice of the other two skill groups is not clear. In the special case
where condition (38) holds with equality, ∆(hm)=∆(hs) > 0, implying that parents
in the intermediate-skill group and those in the high-skill group beneﬁt equally from
supporting laws banning child labor. That both these groups of parents beneﬁtf r o m
supporting such laws can be explained as follows. Child labor laws (here implemented
via compulsory education, i.e., e(e) = 1) reduces the total supply of eﬀective labor.
This will signiﬁcantly raise the equilibrium market wage ω, only if children are suﬃ-
ciently productive in the sense of condition (38) for example.6 This in turn enables
6Levision et al. (1998) report that in India, children in general earn about half of the adult labor
29parents in the high-skill group and the intermediate skill group to both beneﬁtf r o m
the enforcement of these laws.
Proposition 4 Suppose (38) holds with equality. Then, if











labor unions representing adult workers will never have the support of low-skill workers
to seek the adoption of child labor laws.
Proof. The proof is straightforward and proceeds by construction. It suﬃces to that
∆(hu) < 0, when condition (40). First, observe that condition (40) can be rewritten
as follows






















µsths +( µut + µmt)¯ h
µsths + µuthu + µmthm
!1−ξ





since hs >h m >h u and µi ∈ [0,1]. It then suﬃces to note that
ln
Ã
µshs +( µu + µm)¯ h







wage which support the hypothesis that income from child labor sources can play a signiﬁcant role
in the ﬁght against poverty.
30by deﬁnition. Hence the result.
Note that the term ¯ ξ is strictly less than 1 since hs > ¯ h>h m >h u. Therefore
condition (40) can easily obtain for a suitable choice of hi and h0. Condition (40)
implies that labor in eﬃciency units is essential for production. Combined with
condition (38), this condition implies that for low-skill parents, the income gain from
the complete withdrawal of children from the labor force is less than the forgone
income from child labor. As a result, banning child labor imposes a welfare loss
to this category of parents. Hence parents in that skill group will vote against any
proposed resolution to eliminate competitors using cheap child labor.
D. Suﬃcient Conditions for the Emergence of Child Labor Laws
In this subsection, we characterize suﬃcient conditions for child labor laws to
be supported as a political equilibrium. For simplicity we specialize the analysis to
the steady state. By focusing on the steady state alone, we implicitly assume that
laws restricting children’s participation in the labor market do not emerge during the
economy’s transition to a steady state. We then ask under what conditions such laws
can emerge in the steady-state.
Note from proposition 4 above that when the adopted law is e(e)=0 ,t h es e t
of skill levels such that parents with skill levels in that set are the decisive voters is
a singleton: Γ(0) = {hu}. This implies that µu >. 5 during the transition to the
steady state. In such an environment, the unskilled parents choose not to educate
their children (eu = 0), middle class parents choose em = g (hm;0)∈ (0,1), while high
31skill parents choose es = 1. It is therefore clear that as long as µs < 1 in the steady
state, child labor will exists unless a law banning it is voted for by the majority.
Since the transition matrix is time-invariant, the equilibrium law of motion for
the skill distribution is given by µ0 = Π(0)µ,w h e r e
Π(0) =

      

1 − ru [1 − [1 − g (hm;0)]rm − pmg(hm;0)](1 − qm)0
ru [1 − [1 − g (hm;0)]rm − pmg(hm;0)]qm 1 − ps
0[ 1 − g (hm;0)]rm + pmg(hm;0) ps

      

(41)
and µ0 denotes next period skill distribution of agents. Children with parents in the
lowest class (class u)h a v es o m ep r o b a b i l i t y¯ r of becoming middle state parents, even
if they receive zero education (eu =0 ) . T h eh i g h e rru the higher the productivity
of learning-by-doing as a skill-imparting mechanism for low-income family children.
Children from middle class (class m) can become members of any class depending
upon the amount education they receive, as measured by em. Children of the top class
(class s)h a v es o m ep r o b a b i l i t y1−ps of falling to the middle class even if they receive
full education (es = 1). Rewriting the system using the fact that µs =1− µm − µu,















1 − ru [1 − (1 − e∗
m)rm − pme∗
m](1− qm)
ps + ru − 1[ 1 − (1 − e∗
m)rm − pme∗

























































m)=[ 1 − (1 − e∗
m)rm − pme∗
m](1− qm)( 4 4 )
ψ (e∗
m)=2 − ps − [1 − (1 − e∗
m)rm − pme∗
m]qm. (45)




































One can always normalize choose hi, pi, qi, ri,a n dh0 such that both these eigen
values have modulus less than unity. This in turn implies that if a steady state
exists, the economy will eventually converge to it.
Given the level of the parameters pi, qi,a n dri, the unique steady state distribution


































Remark 1. If child labor performed by poor family children does not entail skill-
enhancing learning-by-doing (i.e., ru =0 ), the system converges to a poverty
trap where all individuals are unskilled.
This is because when ru =0 ,µ∗
u = 1, as implied by (49). The intuition behind
this result is that since poor family children do not receive any formal schooling (i.e.,
e∗
u = 0), unless child labor entails learning-by-doing (i.e., ru > 0), these children will
never experience upward social mobility. And as long as there is a positive probability
of downward mobility for children whose parents are in the intermediate and the high
skill groups, the economy’s transition to the steady state will be characterized by
increasing downward mobility toward the unskilled class.
Remark 2. If ru > 0 and there is no downward mobility for children whose parents
are in the high-skill group (i.e., ps =1 ) , then the system converges to a steady
state where all individuals are highly skilled: µ∗
s =1 .
Remark 3. Therefore, as long as ru > 0 and ps < 1, the system converges to steady
state with the coexistence of three diﬀerent skill groups: µ∗
i ∈ (0,1) for all
i = m,s,u.
34A key question at this point of the analysis is under what condition(s) laws man-
dating compulsory education for all children emerge in the steady state. Under the
conditions of proposition 4, and under a majority voting rule, a suﬃcient condition
for laws to emerge in the steady state is that µ∗
u <. 5.
Proposition 5 Let conditions (34), (38), (39) and (40) hold. If in addition
ru ≥
(1 − ps)(1− rm)(1− qm)
1 − ps + rm
, (51)
then laws mandating compulsory education will emerge in the steady state.
Proof. It suﬃces to show that µ∗
u <. 5 whenever condition (51) is satisﬁed. Using
the deﬁnition of µ∗
u in (49), this result follows from the fact that the function φ(e∗
m)
is strictly decreasing in e∗
m.
Since ru ∈ (0,1), condition (51) spells out suﬃcient conditions for laws mandating
compulsory education to emerge in the steady state. Two conditions are suﬃcient:
Note that since µu denotes the total population of poor parents, and given that
children born of these parents do not receive formal education, by the law of large
numbers, ruµu denotes the proportion of poor family children who have access to
a form of child labor that provides opportunities for learning-by-doing; (1 − ru)µu
denotes that of children who do not have access to such child labor and thus will
fail to experience upward social mobility upon reaching adulthood. Condition (51)
therefore implies that in order for laws mandating compulsory education to emerge
in the steady state, a suﬃciently high proportion of poor family children must have
35access to forms of child labor that provide valuable learning-by-doing. This implies
that in poor countries where a large majority of poor children are involved in the
forms of child labor that provide too little or no learning-by-doing, child labor may
persist causing the economy to fall into a poverty trap. This paper therefore support
the view that certain forms of child labor, particularly the most harmful ones should
be banned, in order to allow poor family children to enter only those forms of child
labor that provide valuable learning-by-doing.
Second, since 1 − qm is a measure of the probability of downward mobility for
children whose parents are in the intermediate skill group, another suﬃcient condition
is that this probability be suﬃciently small (i.e., qm must be suﬃciently high). This
will ensures that not enough children whose parents are in the intermediate skill group
transit to the unskilled group when adult.
6C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
In this paper, we have developed a positive theory of the emergence of compulsory
education laws. Our theory uncovers suﬃcient conditions for political support for the
introduction of compulsory education laws to outweigh opposition to these laws in a
steady state. One such condition is that a suﬃciently high proportion of poor family
children (for whom work is the only viable option) must have access to forms of child
labor that provide valuable learning-by-doing. Our theory is therefore consistent with
historical evidence, with respect to forces that led to the adoption of child labor laws
36in Britain and the United States for example. In both these countries, a signiﬁcant
proportion child labor occurs in manufacturing employment which provides more
opportunities for learning-by-doing. View from this angle, our paper diﬀers from
Doepke and Zilibotti (2002) in that unlike ours, theirs does not explain the forces
that lead to the imposition of education/child labor laws in the ﬁrst place.
Our paper also lends support to the view that the harmful forms of child labor
(those that do not entail learning-by-doing) should be banned, in order to allow poor
family children to enter only those forms of child labor that provide learning-by-doing.
Unless this is done appropriately, poor countries may not stand a chance to escape
poverty. Central to our result is the assumption that laws when they emerge, do
so only in the steady state. This assumption was made only for technical reasons,
as characterizing transitional dynamics in the case where laws can emerge during
the economy’s transition to the steady state is rather a complicated task, given the
richness of the model at at.
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